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TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE DECISION 
John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina 
and Herbert F. Weisberg 
Recent developments in formal political analysis have 
spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic 
political processes. The more familiar of the two is the 
theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) 
heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and 
Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and 
others. Somewhat l�ss familiar (perhaps because the 
intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the 
theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots 
in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black 
(1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), 
Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have 
nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory. 
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While the two areas of theoretical work have developed 
separately, they share numerous elements. Both theories 
postulate the existence of a set of voters, N, each of whom 
has a preference relation, R1, on a set of alternatives, X. 
The theory of electoral competition typically embeds the 
set of alternatives in some abstract space, but the basic 
theory does not depend on this embedding, so for the 
present we shall take X to be simply an unstructured set 
of alternatives. Often, restrictions are put on the 
preference relations of individuals, but these too are 
mostly inessential for establishing the basic connections 
between the theories. Thus, we shall rely on the 
ordinalist definition; x is said to be preferred to y by 
individual iEN if and only if xR1y and not yR1x. If both 
xRiy and yR1x, i is said to be indifferent. 
In the theory of legislative behavior an alternative 
x defeats a distinct alternative y in a majority vote only 
if the number of individuals preferring x to y exceeds 
that preferring y to x. A majority rule equilibrium 
(MRE) is a set of alternatives, E, with the property that 
each element is undefeated in a majority vote. A simple 
intuition suggests the MRE as a predictive concept: 
given a legislature in which a proposal, x, not in the 
MRE is on the floor, there is some coalition which has 
both the power to form under the rules of the legislature, 
and the incentive to form to pit some alternative y 
against x. 
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The theory of electoral competition contains two 
additional members of society -- the candidates. 
Candidates announce elements of X as platforms. A 
candidate announcing a platform x defeats a candidate 
announcing a platform y only if the number of voters 
preferring x to y exceeds that preferring y to x. The 
candidates are assumed to prefer victory to defeat. An 
electoral competition eguilibrium (ECE) is a set of 
points C with the property that each point in C is not a 
losing platform. The behavioral motivation here is that 
if a candidate espouses a platform outside C the other 
candidate has the incentive and the ability to find 
another platform that will defeat the first candidate. 
From the preceding exposition it should be evident 
that E = C when either set is nonempty. This oft-noted 
connection has led some to think that the relation 
between the theories is very close -- that they are 
substantively differing interpretations of the same 
formal structure. One should remember, however, that the 
sets C and E are nonempty only in special cases, and that 
existing models of legislative behavior and electoral 
competition are mute with respect to what will happen in 
the (usual) case when these sets are empty. Moreover, 
the two bodies of theory differ in one important element 
of their intuitive content. The basic mechanism in 
electoral competition is that there are two candidates 
competing for votes, whereas in a legislature the 
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strategic activities are undertaken by the various coali­
tions. 
Given these distinctive intuitive contents, some 
analysts make the natural suggestion that we formulate 
the theory of electoral competition as a two-person 
noncooperative game, and the theory of legislative 
decision as an n-person cooperative game. Such a line 
of attack logically need not produce disjunct theories, 
but in practice few connections exist. For example, 
attempts to discern whether the classical solution 
concepts of a mixed strategy equilibrium and a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern solution bear any resemblance 
(Ferejohn, 1974; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1976) reveal 
little overlap between these notions. This failure to 
establish a close tie between the more general theories 
of electoral competition and legislative decision 
reinforces the suggestion that the two theories might 
best develop independently. 
Recent work by McKelvey (1976) raises additional 
doubts about the usefulness of a theory which encompasses 
both electoral competition and legislative decision. 
Presumably, as a starting point for developing a 
general theory we would examine any regularities which 
exist when E = C is empty. But McKelvey shows that if X 
is embedded in a Euclidean space, with individual 
preferences monotonic in Euclidean distance, then when 
E = C = 0, each alternative in X indirectly dominates 
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each other alternative in X. Thus, no regularities may be 
observed when E = C = 0 -- both electoral and legislative 
processes might produce outcomes scattered over the entire 
set of alternatives. If this nihilistic possibility were 
a fact, the outcomes of empirically occurring legislative 
and electoral processes would depend primarily on the 
specific rules and procedures which characterize those 
processes, and on the sophisticated maneuverings of the 
participants in those processes. And, positive models 
of such processes would necessarily focus on what Shepsle 
(1978) calls "structure induced equilibria. " Rather than 
general theories of electoral competition and legislative 
decision, we would have numerous specific theories 
differentiated by the institutional structure explicitly 
assumed by the theory. 
While we believe that the explicit incorporation of 
particular rules and procedures into our models is an 
interesting and potentially profitable avenue of research, 
we are not yet completely convinced that the older 
approach has been milked dry. After all, McKelvey's 
result is a possibility result, no more. Theoretically 
outcomes may scatter over the entire policy space, but 
that is not to say that empirically they actually do so. 
In fact, what little evidence we have suggests the 
opposite. Consider the Fiorina and Plott (1978) experi­
ments on committee decisions under majority rule. The 
principal finding of these authors is that the set E = C 
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is a good predictor of legislative outcomes if it is non­
empty. But even more interesting from our point of view 
is the experimental series in which E = C = 0. Rather 
surprisingly, the experimental outcomes continue to cluster, 
rather than scatter widely over the set X. On the basis of 
their observations Fiorina and Plott speculate that some as 
yet unformulated theory exists which explains the outcomes 
which occur in the absence of an MRE (ECE) , but specializes 
to the latter when it exists. Granted, one experimental 
series is hardly conclusive, but taken together with 
independent experimental findings of the Carnegie group 
(McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer, 1978) it suggests that 
there are regularities in legislative decision processes 
even when the MRE is empty (with no comparable experimental 
results for the electoral competition case we cannot say 
whether analogous regularities exist). 
The remainder of this paper attempts to extend the 
theory of legislative decision to the case of an empty 
MRE . Since experimental evidence motivated us to under­
take this effort we will first describe the experimental 
outcomes in greater detail with emphasis on what we see as 
possible regularities in the outcomes. We will briefly 
note why existing theories do not account for these 
regularities. Then we will sketch a new theory which 
makes predictions for majority rule agenda-free legislative 
processes. Having done so, it is a simple task to outline 
the theoretical predictions for a series of future 
experiments. Until such evidence is in, however, our 
arguments must remain provisional and tentative. 
l. EXPERil!ENTAL EVIDENCE
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The experiments considered in this section took the 
form of five-person committees operating under majority 
rule. The set of alternatives consisted of points in the 
plane, where individual preference over such points was 
monotonic in Euclidean distance from an actor's ideal 
point (for details see Fiorina and Plott). Subjects were 
allowed to debate proposals but were not permitted to 
exchange monetary information about their payoffs. 
Figure 1 shows the experimental outcomes of the 
Fiorina-Plott communication series in the case where E = C 
(39,68). As is evident, the MRE and the mean of the 
experimental results are very close. Moreover, the 
scatter of outcomes is quite small � we are not just 
observing the mutual cancellation of large deviations. 
Figure 2 differs from Figure l only in that the 
player whose ideal point is at (39,68) in Figure l is 
moved southeastward to (51,59). This, of course, destroys 
the MRE and opens up the possibility for McKelvey's 
theorem to operate. But does it? What we see is still a 
fairly tight scatter of experimental outcomes, although 
not so tight as in the case of Figure l. Is there any 
information in this scatter, or does its interest lie 
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merely in the fact that it is not as broad as it might be? 
The mean of the outcomes (45,62) has no obvious signifi­
cance. One fact of interest is that the outcomes tend to 
cluster around but not lie within the centrally located set, 
M, the minimax set (to be discussed in the next section). 
A related fact is that outcomes tend to lie along the 
contract curves between pairs of committee members rather 
than to lie within the regions these curves delineate. 
Admittedly, such observations are casual and based on a 
small number of observations. But consider now the 
experimental series conducted independently at CMCJ. Figure 
3 illustrates the experimental outcomes reported by 
McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer. While the configuration of 
ideal points is qualitatively different from that used in 
the Caltech experiments (no ideal point in the interior 
of the convex hull of the ideals), the observations 
previously made continue to hold. Outcomes cluster around 
but do not enter the central set, M, and they lie along 
the contract curves between pairs of committee members. 
Additionally, the outcomes seem to form several tiny 
"clusters," something less evident in the Caltech experi­
ments, but perhaps also true depending on the perception 
of the reader. 
These two sets of experiments were independently 
designed and conducted. Given this fact and the relatively 
small number of observations, we are impressed that any 
regularities whatsoever should emerge from the findings, 
Figure 3 
11 
Outcomes of 8 Majority Rule Conunittee Experiments, 
Conducted by McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer 
xl 
X4 
X5 
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sufficiently impressed to consider any theory which accounts 
for these regularities. Do such theories presently exist? 
2. THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING THEORIES 
The natural building blocks for a theory of legislative 
behavior would seem to be the solution concepts from the 
theory of cooperative games, Simpson's (1969) minimax set, 
and the competitive solution (CS) of McKelvey, Ordeshook 
and Winer. We will not dwell on the game theoretic 
solution concepts; their shortcomings are discussed in 
McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer. Briefly, in addition to 
the well-known problems of nonuniqueness and nonexistence, 
solution concepts like the V-solution and the Bargaining 
set perform poorly in the experiments previously discussed 
as well as in additional unpublished experiments conducted 
by Plott. 
Simpson has proposed a rather different predictive 
concept, the minimax set. We can define it as follows. 
Let n(yPx) be the number of votes for y against x. Then 
let v(x) =max n(yPx). Finally let M = {x'oX I v(x') = 
min v(x) 
yEX 
yEX 
Given finite N, M always exists. Indeed the 
sets, M, in Figures 1 and 2 are the minimax sets. They are 
easy to compute and "centrally" located. Further, as the 
number or voters increases, provided they are scattered 
evenly over the space, the size of M shrinks (Kramer, 1977). 
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Finally, if E is nonempty, M '- E. 
Kramer has provided an interesting though somewhat 
implausible motivation of M for the case of electoral 
competition. Assume there are two candidates competing 
for votes who both obey the following rule: When the 
opposing candidate adopts platform xEX, adopt a platform 
ze::X with the property that N(zPx) = v(x). That is, both 
candidates are sequential vote maximizers. Kramer shows 
that assuming a stable policy space and stable voter 
preferences, the outcome of this process "converges" to 
M as successive elections take place. 
A less dynamic motivation is as follows. If xEX 
then even if it can be beaten by some other element y, 
the size of the minority coalition supporting x is at a 
maximum. Thus, it might be more difficult to locate such 
a y or to organize it to defeat x. This motivation is 
admittedly less elegant than Kramer's but it is developed 
in the context of the legislative situation. 
There are various difficulties with the minimax set. 
It can include a relatively large subset of the set of 
alternatives, although this problem fades as N increases. 
More importantly from our standpoint, the existing 
experimental observations, while often "near" M, tend to 
cluster on its boundaries. Thus, we suspect that M is too 
broad, that a sharper concept might exist. In particular, 
can we formulate a concept that isolates the boundaries of 
!!'! 
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Most recently McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer have 
proposed a new solution concept the ncompetitive 
solution." The latter is a set of proposals and supporting 
coalitions constructed as follows. Each coalition puts 
forward exactly one alternative which may be considered its 
official proposal. A collection of such proposals is a 
competitive solution if each individual is indifferent as 
to which coalition he joins. Work on this concept is in an 
intermediate stage and, at present, it is not clear whether 
the competitive solution generally exists. In the five­
person legislative experiments conducted by the Carnegie 
group the CS works well as a predictor of the experimental 
results. But more theoretical work must be done before a 
fair evaluation of the CS can be given. Although we admire 
its aesthetics, we have found it difficUlt to work with and 
doubt that a general existence theorem can be obtained for 
broad classes of interesting games, including the larger 
spatial games. Thus, we are not yet prepared to put all our 
theoretical eggs in this basket. 
3. A THEORY OF AGENDA-FREE LEGISLATURES 
The experimental legislatures operated by Fiorina and 
Plott have no preset agenda. Any member can offer an amend­
ment to the proposal on the floor at any time, although all 
voting between motions is formal and pairwise. The initial 
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proposals, typically made in ignorance, tend to be casual 
suggestions of individual maxima or various "symmetrical" 
points, e.g. (50,50) or (100,75). But after some information 
has been exchanged through votes and debate, the process of 
proposal generation not surprisingly settles down into a 
reflection of the dynamics of majority-building. This 
process is more truncated than one might expect. We know 
that for any proposal on the floor numerous majority 
preferred alternatives exist, but one seldom observes more 
than a few of these actually put up for a vote. Moreover, 
at some point the committee will accept a relatively 
successful motion on the floor even though many alternative 
proposals not yet considered could defeat it. Boredom? 
Perhaps. But consider an alternative more systematic 
notion. 
We say that proposal xeX is vulnerable to a coalition 
c f.N if there is a yeX such that everyone in c prefers y to 
x and c is a majority. Equivalently, x is vulnerable to a 
�ority coalition if it is not contained in the Pareto set 
of that coalition. We let c(x) denote the collection of 
coalitions to which x is vulnerable. If c(x) = 0 we say x 
�s invulnerable. Generally, however we can associate with 
each xe:x a real number c(x) = jc(x)j which will be called 
the vulnerability of x. We may note the following facts: 
Proposition l: c (x) = 0 <-> x e:E 
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Proposition 2: L {xe:x !c(x) = min c(z)} is nonempty. 
zsx 
The first proposition simply notes the obvious fact 
that the MRE is the set of invulnerable points. The second 
proposition notes the equally obvious but somewhat more 
interesting fact that some point(s) in any collective 
decision situation will be less vulnerable than all other 
points, although this point(s) will not have 0-vulnerability 
when an MRE fails to exist. 
One can use the notion of vulnerability to generate 
several solution concepts. As yet we are agnostic about 
which is the best candidate for future development. The 
basic idea underlying any of the possibilities, however, is 
the following. If xeX is on the floor, it is vulnerable to 
each coalition in c (x). Ceteris paribus, we would expect 
to observe x defeated by an alternative proposal, y, the 
larger the size of c (x). That is, the more coalitions 
contained in c (x), the lower the odds that x will be the 
collective choice. As mentioned, there are various ways to 
use this intuitive expectation. Perhaps the simplest is to 
note that the set {c(x) J xEX} can be totally ordered as 
follows: 
c(x) � c(z) <=> c(x) ::-. c(z)
An infimum of the � relation is obtained on the set L in
proposition 2, so that one could take L, the least 
vulnerable set, as the solution concept� 
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Alternatively, one could investigate a probabilistic 
hypothesis about the association between vulnerability and 
legislative outcomes. More precisely, we can examine the 
prediction that the 11likelihood11 of a given outcome depends 
directly on its vulnerability. In the case of Figure 4 (a 
partial reproduction of Figure 2) such a probabilistic model 
might identify point d as most likely, followed by the other 
three vertices of the minimax set {a,b,c}, followed then by 
the union of the open line segments (ab)u(bd)u(cd)v(ac) 
which bound the minimax set, which, we might add ties (in 
terms of vulnerability) points on contract curves relatively 
"far" from the minimax set. Given that existing experimental 
observations typically fall near the boundary of the minimax 
set, we regard a probabilistic vulnerability theory as 
promising. Figure 4 reveals that even those points which 
fall far from the boundary of the minimax set still tend 
toward the locally least vulnerable points -- the contract 
curves between committee members always have vulnerability 
at least as low as the regions they bound. All in all, 
Figure 4 shows a clear tendency for outcomes to cluster near 
the less vulnerable points even though such points comprise 
only a tiny fraction of the points in the space. 
The outcomes of the Carnegie experiments would look 
very good from the standpoint of the theory of vulnerability 
were it not for the fact that an alternative theory (CS) 
does even better. In Figure S the vertices of the minimax 
110-
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set are the least vulnerable points, followed by the union 
of the open line segments connnecting them. The experimental 
outcomes fall midway along such line segments -- near points 
of second lowest vulnerability in other words. We will say 
more about this situation below. For now, we make the 
observation that the Carnegie game is less stable than the 
Caltech game in the sense that with N constant at five, the 
Caltech game possesses a single point with lower vulner­
ability than the five equi-vulnerable points of the Carnegie 
game. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of some formal 
properties of the L theory of vulnerability we wish to point 
out several features of the concept of vulnerability. First, 
like the minimax set, the notion of vulnerability diverges 
sharply from the solution concepts Of game theory and voting 
theory. The latter invariably pose either-or questions: 
does it exist or not? In contrast, least vulnerable points 
and vulnerability orderings always exist. The vulnerability 
concept poses a question of degree 11how stable," --
rather than one of kind -- "stable or unstable. " When a 0-
vulnerable point(s) exists, a high degree of stability 
characterizes the legislative situation. But ceteris 
paribus a legislative situation possessing a j-vulnerable 
point(s) may well exhibit greater predictability than one 
possessing a k-vulnerable point(s) (where 0 < j < k) although 
the prevailing theories fail to differentiate between the 
latter two situations, lumping both together as "unstable. "  
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A second point concerns the scope of application of the 
theories of vulnerability. Existing solution theories 
presume a world of perfect or free information, infinitely 
discriminating players and only one game in town. In the 
real world we find poor and/or costly infOrmation, thick 
�ndifference curves, and a rich menu of decisions so that 
time and resources sunk in one decision means a lessened 
ability to capitalize on other potentially attractive 
opportunities. The theory of vulnerability presumes this 
real world context: No MRE may exist, but there may be 
numerous points which are stable "for all practical 
purposes • " 
Given such a motivation it is natural to expect the 
theory of vulnerability to apply most convincingly to 
decisions involving numerous players deciding among 
numerous alternatives. To illustrate this point consider 
Figures 6a-6c. 
two-dimensional 
Figure 
policy 
6a is a three-person conunittee in a 
space. The 
are the least vulnerable points in 
individual ideal points 
the game. (!-vulnerable), 
but we would not expect experimental outcomes to fall at 
these points. Why? There are only four winning coalitions 
in this situation -- few enough to run through sequentially 
� and it is perfectly obvious which coalition can upset 
each I-vulnerable point. Such conditions facilitate 
exhaustive, fine-tuned negotiations such as those formalized 
in the CS. Similarly, consider Figure 6b which illustrates 
a (small)finite alternative case. L consists of proposals 
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Figure 6c 11-Person Committee, Spatial Case 
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x1 and x2, but given that there are only five alternative 
proposals to check (all of which defeat x1 and x2 by some 
coalition) we doubt that L would be a good predictor of 
such a conmtittee's decision. 
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In contrast, consider Figure 6c which represents an 
elven-person committee (still fairly small as real 
legislatures go). This situation has a set of 9-vulnerable 
points, and various other points of low vulnerability. In 
absolute terms such points can be upset by numerous (i.e. 
nine) coalitions, but there are 1,024 winning coalitions in 
the game (462 of which are minimal winning). Looking at 
Figure 6c it may still be fairly obvious to us which nine 
coalitions can upset which point, but 1n a real world 
confused legislature will it be so obvious-? We think not. 
As N increases (and as the complexity of the policy decision 
increases) upsetting points such as those identified in 
Figure 6c becomes exceedingly difficult. We might add that 
the comprehensive balancing act presumed by the CS becomes 
increasingly implausible as well. Thus, it is with tongues 
only partially in cheek that we propose the theory of 
vulnerability as a theory of "large11 legislatures. 
5. CURRENT RESEARCH 
We are now engaged in several lines of inquiry. First 
we have investigated the connection between the least-
25 
vulnerable set and other nonequilibrium solution concepts 
such as the minimax set. In general, no set inclusion 
relation exists even though both sets tend to be "centrally11 
located vis-a-vis the collection of voters. There appears 
to be some relationship in a spatial setup if the 
dimensionality of 'the space is small relative to the number 
of voters.* 
Second, we have been trying to formalize a stochastic 
theory of vulnerability. A variety of Markov processes 
governing transitions from one proposal to others turn out 
to have the same ergodic sets. Moreover, these sets arise 
elsewhere in the theory of social choice and the theory of 
voting bodies. We are also trying to characterize the 
limiting distributions of these stochastic processes. In 
particular we would like to know what kinds of concentration 
properties hold for these distributions, in order to see if 
we can obtain stochastic convergence theorems that are 
analogous to Kramer's (1977) deterministic convergence result 
(since writing this paper we have made some progress along 
the lines discussed in this paragraph. See Ferejohn, 
�iorina and Packel, 1978). 
Finally, consider a spatial game with Type I preferences. 
It appears to us that it is possible to calculate the maximum 
* 
For example, Figures 4 and 5 appears to represent the 
general case in two-dimensional spatial contexts with an 
odd number of voters (L may fall within M if the number of 
voters is even). 
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value for L for a game of any N and given dimensionality (d). 
As one would expect, this value increases with N and with d. 
At least for games of small dimensionality, however, L 
increases far less rapidly than the number of winning 
coalitions in the game. To illustrate, a five-person spatial 
game in two dimensions has at worst a 3-vulnerable point(s). 
Given that there are sixteen winning coalitions in the game, 
3-vulnerable points are subject to overthrow by 19 percent 
of the possible winning coalitions. An eleven-person game
in two dimensions has at worst a 9-vulnerable point(s). But 
given that such a game has 1,024 winning coalitions, the 9-
vulnerable points are subject to upset by less than 1 
percent of the possible winning coalitions. We believe that 
real world legislatures customarily consider proposals 
composed of few components -- far fewer than the number of 
legislators (this is the whole purpose of germaneness rules 
and other restrictions on amendments). Thus, we suspect that 
real legislatures have numerous "near-cores, '1 points which 
are very difficult, although not impossible to upset. Our 
conjecture, if proven, would lead to an empirical expectation 
quite the opposite of that arising from McKelvey's theorem. 
We are as yet unable to derive a general formula which would 
give vulnerability as a function of N and d. Recent work by 
Schofield (1978) may bear some relationship to this effort. 
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